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Abstract 
 
In order to resist unauthorized access, consumer storage devices are typically protected using a low entropy password. However, 
storage devices are not fully protected against an adversary because the adversary can utilize an off-line dictionary attack to find 
the correct password and/or run an existing algorithm for resetting the existing password. In addition, a password protected 
device may also be stolen or misplaced allowing an adversary to easily retrieve all the stored confidential information from a 
removable storage device. In order to protect the consumer’s confidential information that has been stored, this paper proposes a 
mutual authentication and key negotiation protocol that can be used to protect the confidential information in the device. The 
functionality of the protocol enables the storage device to be secure against relevant security attacks. A formal security analysis 
using Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic is presented to verify the presented algorithm. In addition, a performance analysis 
of the proposed protocol reveals a significantly reduced communication overhead compared to the relevant literature.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Consumer storage is commonly used to store and retrieve digital information. Consumers often store confidential information, 
files, or digital media purchases in the device. These devices are low cost and easily portable so the consumer often carries the 
device when travelling. As a result, the device may be lost or stolen by an adversary. If the confidential information is not 
protected, an adversary can easily retrieve the stored information from the device memory. However, the adversary faces a 
problem to retrieve the information from the store if the device is password protected. It is worth noting that a user’s password 
(typically low entropy) cannot provide a strong secure system under a cryptographic dictionary attack. Indeed, many techniques 
are currently available to guess the password to access the device. 
 
Mutual authentication and key agreement protocols are a popular paradigm in client-server environments to prevent unauthorized 
access. In 1981, Lamport [1] first introduced the secure communication client-server architecture and then numerous protocols 
[2]-[4] have been proposed for several applications, including wireless sensor networks [5], medical systems [6] and file security 
for USB based Mass Storage Devices (USB MSD) [7]-[12]. In order to provide secure access, authentication protocols play an 
important role. 
 
Significant literature is now available to provide solutions to protect confidential files stored in a USB MSD. Yang et al. [7] first 
proposed a secure authentication protocol using the Schnorr Signature to protect the information stored. However, Chen et al. [8] 
argued that the protocol from Yang et al. [7] was not secure against the forgery attack and the replay attack. Furthermore, Lee et 
al. [9] argued that the protocol by Chen et al. [8] was computationally inefficient. In order to solve the security weaknesses, Lee 
et al. [9] proposed the three-factor authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography. The protocol from Lee et al. [9] 
required the user’s password, biometric and smartcard information as authentication tokens. More recently, He et al. [10] 
demonstrated that the protocol proposed by Lee et al. [9] was not secure against the password guessing attack, Denial-of-Service 
(DoS) attack and the replay attack, so proposed an improved three-factor authentication scheme. In order to resist the DoS attack, 
He et al. [10] employed the concept of the fuzzy extractor [13], [14]. In 2015, Amin and Biswas [15] proposed a three-factor 
authentication protocol for the same environment using a hash function to achieve a lower computation cost than existing 
protocols [9], [10]. 
 
This paper proposes a mutual authentication and key agreement protocol to provide only authorized access to confidential 
information stored on the device with the aid of a Registration Server (RS). A new user completes a registration procedure with 
RS allowing RS to deliver a link via e-mail from which the user can download and install registration software in their device 
which also incorporates the required secure access information relevant for only each user. In order to provide secure access to 
files, the user provides the necessary identity, password and biometric information. The device checks the legitimacy of the user 
and then negotiates a session key with RS. It is to be noted that this session key is used to encrypt the files in the storage device.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents an overview of the contribution and the novelty claims. Section 
III presents the hash function, fuzzy extractor and elliptic curve cryptography. The proposed protocol is provided in Section IV. 
The security analysis using BAN logic is discussed in Section V. Section VI provides the performance evaluation and 
comparison of the proposed protocol with related protocols. Section VII concludes the paper. TABLE I shows the nomenclature 
that is used throughout the paper.  
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TABLE I 
NOMENCLATURE 
Term Usage 
Ui                       i-th user  
RS                      Remote server 
PWi                      Password of user Ui 
BTi                        Biometric Template of user Ui 
IDi                      Identity of user Ui 
Ek[]                     Symmetric key encryption using key k 
Dk[]                Symmetric key decryption using key k 
x Secret key of the remote server 
(Px, Py) x and y coordinate of the elliptic curve point P 
Ti Current timestamp of Ui’s storage device 
Tj Current timestamp of the Remote server 
ΔT Estimated time delay 
UNSID Unique software identity 
SL Software link 
h(·) Cryptographic one-way hash function 
REP() REP procedure in fuzzy extractor 
GEN() GEN procedure in fuzzy extractor 
⊕ Bitwise XOR operator 
|| Concatenation operator 
(a.b) Point  multiplication operation of a and b 
 
 
II. SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT 
 
In this work, a Registration Server (RS) delivers a link to all the users who have performed registration successfully, and then 
each user uses the link to obtain and install software in their device while also providing their credentials (password, identity and 
biometric signature.) Note that while the password may be guessed, it is hard to guess biometric signatures. Then, the software 
encrypts important files by using a negotiated key to provide security on the storage file. Whenever, the user of that device wants 
to access that file, RS first verifies the user and then provides a decryption key to recover the original file. All the files are then 
encrypted using a new session key. However, we argue that a storage device will still not be completely security protected. 
Hence, we have devised a standard security protocol which protects the storage device to defend unauthorized access. Firstly we 
have used the concept of biometric data along with a password in our protocol, hence it is difficult to guess the password along 
with biometric information. Secondly, an attacker cannot utilize a resetting technique, as we have mentioned in our protocol that 
if the attacker desires to use resetting technique, he/she first has to login into the system. As the attacker cannot login into the 
system without biometric data, the resetting technique is not usable. 
 
This paper achieves the following contributions: 
 A mutual authentication and key negotiation protocol to provide security protection of the stored information on the storage 
device, 
 Security analysis to show that the proposed protocol is robust against known security attacks. Furthermore, in the proposed 
scheme, the mutual authentication and session key agreement have been verified using BAN logic. 
 Significantly less communication overhead and computation costs than other related systems. 
 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
 
This section defines the fuzzy extractor [10]-[14] and the hash function [15] to analyze the security of the proposed protocol. 
Furthermore, the hardness assumption on the elliptic curve group is discussed. 
 
Definition 1: A cryptographic one-way hash function maps a binary string of an arbitrary length to a binary string of fixed length, 
called the hashed value. It can be symbolized as: :{0,1}* {0,1}nh  , where n is a positive integer. The properties of the hash 
function have been presented [4], [5]. 
 
Definition 2: A fuzzy system based collision resistant extractor can be modeled as a procedure which takes a binary string, say b, 
of some metric space  0,1
n
M   as an input for some positive number n and outputs a random string, say  0,1
l
   for some 
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positive number l and an auxiliary string, say  r1,0  for some positive number r, where r can be l or n. This mapping 
procedure is denoted by GEN:  M . Another procedure which takes two inputs: (i) a binary string say, 'b  of the metric 
space  0,1
n
M  , where  'b b , and (ii) an uniform distribution binary string say,  r1,0 , and it produces the random string 
 0,1
l
  as output. This mapping procedure is denoted by   ': MREP . 
 
A. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)  
 
The concept of elliptic curve cryptography was introduced by Kobiltz [16] and Miller [17], to design public key cryptosystems. 
Let  ,pE a b  be a set of elliptic curve points over prime field pF , where p is a large prime number. The elliptic curve equation 
is defined as: pbaxxy mod32   with  , pa b F  and  
3 24 27 mod 0a b p  . The additive ECC group is defined as: 
pp FyxyxG  ,:),{(  and }{)},(),( ObaEyx p  , where the point O  is known as the ‘Point at Infinity’. The scalar point 
multiplication on the cyclic group pG  is defined as: [k].P = P + P +… + P), that means k times addition of P.  
 
Definition 3: Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem: Given  , pQ R G , computation of the integer *pk Z  is hard, where
 .R k Q . 
 
Definition 4: Elliptic curve computational Diffie-Helman problem: Given     , . , .P a P b P , for some , *pa b Z , computation of 
   . .a b P  is hard. 
 
IV. PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
 
This section describes the proposed mutual authentication and key negotiation protocol, which includes seven phases, (A) 
Registration and software installation phase, (2) Login phase, (C) Mutual authentication and key negotiation phase, (D) File 
management phase, (E) File accessing phase, (F) Password renewal phase and (G) Biometric renewal phase. 
 
Initially, RS chooses a secret key x  and computes  .pubP x P  as the corresponding public key. It should be noted that 
execution of the registration phase and the registration software installation phase is performed only once.  
 
A. Registration and Software Installation Phase  
 
Initially, each new user Ui must complete a registration procedure with RS. In this phase, Ui provides their information securely 
or in person (off-line mode) to RS. Then, RS securely sends to Ui, via e-mail, a link to downloadable registration software which 
must be installed in the storage device. The description of this phase is given below: 
 
Step 1: Ui first chooses ,i iID PW  and scans the user’s biometric template, BTi, such as a fingerprint. This work uses the 
biometric template to provide a high degree security since biometric templates cannot easily be forged [10]-[15]. Ui’s device 
computes  ||i i iPWB h PW b , where ib is a random number generated by Ui and then sends iii BTPWBID ,,  and a valid e-
mail address to RS securely either using Transport Layer Security (TLS) or in person (off-line mode.) 
 
Step 2: After receiving the registration message, RS computes    ,i i iGEN BT   ,  ||i i iA h PWB  ,  ||i iG h ID x , 
iii PWBGB  ,  ||i i i iC h ID PWB   and  || ||ii G i i iD E A B C , where GEN() is the fuzzy extractor function. 
 
Step 3: RS then embeds ()(),(),,,, hREPGENBIDD iii  into the required registration software including all necessary 
parameters for the ECC cryptosystem. The registration software is a simple software application that must be installed in the 
consumer device. RS needs to maintain a database for storing all the registration information for all the consumers. RS stores 
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 , , ,i i iID UNSID SL   into the database, where iUNSID and iSL are the unique software identity and software link respectively, 
and   indicates empty attributes used to store the encrypted key. Finally, RS delivers to Ui via e-mail a link to user specific 
registration software (that includes iSL .) This registration software is provided by the registration server to all the consumers 
with the software content varying with the user. 
 
Step 4: After receiving the link for Ui to download the registration software, Ui installs it on their personal storage device. Ui then 
inputs bi into the registration software. Finally, the registration software installed in Ui’s storage device contains
()(),(),,,,, hREPGENbBIDD iiii . 
 
B. Login Phase 
 
This phase ensures that a non-registered user could not install the registration software without providing the correct information. 
The device runs the registration software now installed in the storage device and the software requests Ui to input their identity, 
password and biometric information (IDi, PWi and BTi). Then the registration software checks the legitimacy of Ui by verifying 
the user’s information by calculating  ' ||i i iPWB h PW b , 
''
iii PWBBG  ,    '' || ' || '
i
i i i iG
A B C D D , 
 ' '|| 'i i i ih ID PWB C   ,  '' ,i i iREP B   and  '' ' '||i i iA h PWB  . The registration software checks whether the conditions 
'?
''
ii AA   and ii BB ?'  holds. If both the conditions are true, then the registration software of Ui accepts that the information 
provided by Ui is correct; otherwise, it aborts the session. 
 
C. Mutual Authentication and Key Negotiation Phase 
 
This phase first achieves mutual authentication and then negotiates a session key between the registration software of Ui and RS 
over an insecure channel. In this process, Ui and RS perform the following steps: 
 
Step 1: Ui runs the registration software installed in his/her device and then provides their IDi, PWi and BTi to the registration 
software. Then the registration software of Ui computes  ' ||i i iPWB h PW b , 
''
iii PWBBG  ,    '' || ' || '
i
i i i iG
A B C D D , 
 ' '|| 'i i i ih ID PWB C   ,  ' ',i i iREP B   and  '' ' '||i i iA h PWB  . The registration software in Ui’s device checks 
conditions '?
''
ii AA   and ii BB ?' . If both the conditions are not correct, registration software of Ui aborts the connection; 
otherwise, accepts Ui. 
 
Step 2: The registration software in Ui generates random number ir  and sends ii TMID ,, 5  to RS through an insecure channel, 
where PrM i ].[1  , 12 ].[ MM i , pubiyx PGKKM ].[),(
'
3  , )||||||||( 214 yii KTMMIDhM   and   
)||||||( 415 iiK CPWBMMEM x .  
 
Step 3: After receiving ii TMID ,, 5 , RS first checks the existence of iID  in the user database held by RS. If the entry does not 
exist then RS rejects the connection, otherwise RS checks the timestamp validity condition TTT ij  || holds, where jT  is the 
current timestamp of RS. If it does not hold, RS rejects the connection; otherwise RS computes the legitimacy of Ui by 
computing  ' ||i iG h ID x ,  
 ' ' ' '3 , .x y i pubM K K G P     ,    '1 4 5|| || || xi i KM M PWB C D M ,  
' ||i i i ih ID PWB C   , 
' '
2 1.iM M     and 
)||||||||(
''
21
'
3 yii KTMMIDhM  . RS checks whether  3
'
3 ?MM   is true. If it is correct, then RS accepts Ui; otherwise, 
rejects Ui.  
 
Step 4: RS generates random number jr  and computes 
'
2.j jSK r M    ,  
'
6 || || || ||i i x j jM h ID PWB K r T  and 
 '7 6 ||
y
jK
M E M r . RS sends 7M  to the registration software in Ui through a public channel. 
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Step 5: After receiving 7M , the registration software in Ui first checks whether the timestamp validity condition TTT jjc  ||
holds, where jcT  is the current timestamp at the user end. If it fails, the registration software of Ui terminates the session; 
otherwise, it decrypts 7M  to obtain  6 , jM r  as    '6 7||
y
j K
M r D M . The registration software in Ui further computes 
 ' '6 || || || ||i i x j jM h ID PWB K r T  and checks 6 6 'M M . If true, RS is verified. Then registration software in Ui computes 
session key as 2[ ].i jSK r M , which must be equal to jSK  and used to encrypt desired files stored in the memory of the 
consumer storage device.  
 
D. File Management Phase 
 
After performing mutual authentication and key negotiation, the registration software can encrypt any chosen files (F1, F2, …, 
Fn), using the encryption key iSK  for security protection. Note that, the registration software in Ui can forget the encryption key 
after encrypting any files and send a confirmation message to RS. In this proposed protocol, RS maintains a table against each 
user Ui with the identity IDi.  Now, RS stores   i iSK h ID x   in the table against the identity IDi. 
 
E. File Accessing Phase 
 
In this phase, Ui makes a request to RS to access the encrypted files stored in the consumer’s storage device. In order to do it, Ui 
executes Steps 1-3 of the mutual authentication and key negotiation phase to verify the legitimacy of Ui and generate a new 
session key. After the verification, RS first generates a random number 
'
jr  'j jr r  and then computes the new session key 
' '
2.j jSK r M    , where  
'
j jSK SK  and the random numbers are different in each session. Furthermore, RS then computes 
 ' '6 || || || ||i i x j jM h ID PWB K r T ,  ' '7 6 ||
y
jK
M E M r  and retrieves   i iSK h ID x  from the local table in RS and then 
computes the old session key iSK . Finally, RS computes  '8
x
iK
M E SK  and sends 87 ,MM  to Ui through an insecure 
channel. Then, the registration software in Ui decrypts 7M  and 8M  using
'
yK  and
'
xK  respectively. In order to verify the 
legitimacy of RS, the registration software in Ui computes  ' ' '6 || || || ||i i x j jM h ID PWB K r T . If '6 6M M , the registration 
software of Ui rejects the connection; otherwise, decrypts the encrypted files using the old key iSK obtained from 8M and can 
then access the files. After that, the registration software in Ui encrypts all the required files using the new key 
' ' '
2.i j jSK SK r M     . Finally, the registration software in Ui sends a confirmation message to RS that the obtained encrypted 
file is correct. Next, RS stores   'i iSK h ID x   in the table against iID .  
 
F. Password Renewal Phase 
 
This phase is infrequently used and the choice is dependent on the needs of the user. The description of the password update 
procedure is given as follows: 
 
Step 1: Ui runs the registration software installed in their device, then provides their IDi, the current PWi and BTi. Then the Ui 
registration software computes  ' ||i i iPWB h PW b , 
''
iii PWBBG  ,    '' || ' || '
i
i i i iG
A B C D D ,  ' '|| 'i i i ih ID PWB C   , 
 ' ',i i iREP B   and  
'' ' '||i i iA h PWB  . The registration software in Ui checks whether both '?
''
ii AA   and ii BB ?'  hold. 
If fasle Ui aborts the session. 
 
Step 2: Ui inputs a new password
*
iPW . The registration software in Ui computes  * * ||i i iPWB h PW b , *'* iii PWBGB  , 
 * * '||i i iA h PWB  ,  * ' *||i i i iC h ID PWB   and  '* * * *|| ||
i
i i i iG
D E A B C .  
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Step 3: Finally, the registration software in Ui replaces iD  with new value 
*
iD  and keeps the remaining information unchanged. 
Thus, Ui can change their old password without requesting any assistance from RS.  
 
G. Biometric Renewal Phase 
 
The execution of this phase is important whenever an existing user is willing to update their biometric information. The 
description of this phase is given as follows: 
 
Step 1: Ui runs the registration software installed the device and then provides previous login information IDi, PWi and BTi to the 
registration software. Then the registration software in Ui computes  ' ||i i iPWB h PW b , 
''
iii PWBBG  , 
   '' || ' || '
i
i i i iG
A B C D D ,   ' '|| 'i i i ih ID PWB C   ,  ' ',i i iREP B   and  '' ' '||i i iA h PWB  . The registration software in 
Ui checks that both conditions '?
''
ii AA   and ii BB ?' . If false, the registration software in Ui aborts the session. 
 
Step 2: Ui inputs new the biometric table 
*
iBT . the registration software of Ui computes    * * *,i i iGEN BT   , 
 * *||i i iA h PWB  ,  * * ||i i i iC h ID PWB  , and  
* * *|| ||
ii G i i i
D E A B C . 
 
Step 3: Finally, the registration software in Ui replaces iD  with the new value 
*
iD  and keeps the remaining information 
unchanged. Thus, Ui can change/renew biometric information without requesting any assistance from RS.  
 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
This section explores the security of the proposed mutual authentication and key negotiation protocol. This work employs BAN 
logic [5], [10], [18], [19] to demonstrate that the proposed protocol provides secure authentication. The informal security 
analysis examines that the proposed protocol is secure against relevant security attacks.  
 
A. Authentication Proof based on BAN Logic 
 
In this section, the security of the proposed protocol is analyzed using BAN logic. BAN logic is a well-known security 
verification and analysis model. It has been widely used for analyzing the security of authentication and session key agreement 
protocols. Some preliminaries and notations of BAN logic: 
a) Principals are those agents involved in the protocol (usually people or programs). 
b) Keys are used to encrypt messages symmetrically. 
c) Public Keys are similar to keys except that they are used in pairs. 
d) Nonces are message parts that are not meant to be repeated. 
e) Timestamps are similar to nonce in that they are unlikely to be repeated.  
 
Relevant BAN logic statements that are useful for analyzing security of the proposed protocol are: 
R1: P | X: P believes X or P would be entitled to believe X. In particular, P can take X as true 
R2: P X: P sees X. P has received some message X and is capable of reading and repeating it. 
R3: P |~X: P once said X. P at some time sent a message including the statement X. It is not known whether this is a replay,   
though it is known that P believed X when it was sent. 
R4: P X: P has jurisdiction over X. The principal P is  an authority on X and should be trusted on this matter. 
R5:  ♯(X): The message X is fresh. 
R6: (X, Y): The formulae X or Y is one part of the formulae (X, Y). 
R7:  <X>Y: The formulae X combined with the formulae Y. 
R8: {X}K: The formulae X is encrypted under the formulae K. 
R9: (X)K: The formulae X is hashed with the key K. 
R10: P 
K
 Q: Principal P and Q communicate via shared key K. 
R11: P   Q: The formulae X is a secret known only to P and Q only and possible to principal trusted by them. 
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R12: SK: The session key used in the current session. 
 
Relevant logical postulates of BAN logic for this work are: 
 
 The message-meaning rule:  
XQP
XPQP K
|~|
,

  ,  
if the principal P believes that the secret key K is shared with the principal Q and P receives the message X encrypted with K 
then, P believes that the principal Q once sent the message X. 
 
 The freshness-conjuncatenation rule: 
),(|
)(|
YXP
XP


, 
if the principal believes that X is fresh, then the principal P believes freshness of (X, Y). 
 
 The belief rule: 
),(|
)(|),(|
YXP
YPXP


, 
if the principal P believes X and Y, then the principal P believes (X, Y). 
 
 The nonce verification rule: 
XQP
XQPXP


||
|~|),(| , 
if the principal P believes that X is fresh and the principal Q once sent X then, principal P believes that Q believes X.  
 
 The jurisdiction rule: 
XP
XQPXQP


|
||,|
, 
if the principal believes that Q has jurisdiction over X and Q believes X, then P believes that X is true. 
 
 The session key rule: 
QPP
XQPXP
K

|
)(||),(|
, 
if the principal P believes that the session key is fresh and the principal P and Q believes X, which are the necessary parameters 
of the session key, then principal P believes that he/she shares the session key K with Q. 
 
In order to prove the proposed protocol secure, the proposed protocol must satisfy the following goals based on BAN logic, 
where RS and iU define registration server and consumer respectively.  
 
Goal 1: RSUU
SK
ii |  
Goal 2: RSURSU
SK
ii  ||  
Goal 3: i
SK
URSRS |  
Goal 4: i
SK
i URSURS  ||  
 
The proposed protocol is transformed to the idealized form as:  
1MSG : RSU i  : ii TMID ,, 5 :
iG
M1  
2MSG : iURS  : 7M : 
xK
jr  
 
The following assumptions about the initial state of the protocol are given: 
1ASM : ),(| jii rrU   
2ASM : ),(| ij rrRS   
3ASM : RSUU
iG
ii |  
:4ASM i
Kx
URSRS |  
:5ASM ji rRSU |  
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:6ASM ii rURS |  
 
Applying BAN logic rules and assumptions:  
1MSG : RSU i  : ii TMID ,, 5 :
iG
M1  
 
Thus 
S1:
5, ,i iRS ID M T :
iG
M1  
 
Applying assumption 4ASM , S1 and message meaning rule gives: 
S2: 1~| MURS i  
 
According to 2ASM , S2, freshness-conjuncatenation and nonce verification rule: 
S3: 1|| MURS i  , where information of the parameter 1M is used to computed the session key in our protocol.  
 
According to 6ASM , S3 and jurisdiction rule: 
S4: 1| MRS   
 
According to 2ASM , S3 and session key rule: 
S5: i
SK
URSRS |             (Goal 3) 
 
According to 2ASM , S5 and nonce verification rule: 
S6: i
SK
i URSURS  ||             (Goal 4) 
 
2MSG : iURS  : 7M :
xK
jr  
According to seeing rule: 
S7: iU  : 7M :
xK
jr  
Applying the assumption 3ASM , S7 and message meaning rule: 
S8: ji rRSU ~|  
According to 1ASM , S8, freshness-conjuncatenation and nonce verification rule: 
S9: ji rRSU  | , where information of the parameter jr is used to computed session key in our protocol.  
 
According to 5ASM , S9 and jurisdiction rule: 
S10: ji rU |  
 
According to 1ASM , S9 and session key rule: 
S11: RSUU
SK
ii |             (Goal 1) 
 
According to 1ASM , S11 and nonce verification rule: 
S12: RSURSU
SK
ii  ||            (Goal 2) 
 
The above justification claims that the declared goals have been successfully proven using BAN logic model. Therefore, it can 
be claimed that the proposed protocol successfully provides mutual authentication property as well as session key negotiation 
between the user and RS. 
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B. Further Security Analysis 
 
It has been observed that numerous authentication protocols [1], [2], [13], [14], [17], [20] analyze the resilience against known 
attacks through informal security analysis [21], [22]. Therefore, this section provides the description of the resilience against the 
known security attacks, such as off-line password guessing attack, privileged insider attack, user impersonation attack, server 
impersonation attack, known key security attack, stolen-verifier attack, DoS attack and mutual authentication.  
 
1) Off-line password guessing attack 
 
During the registration phase, Ui’s password PWi was never transmitted to RS in plaintext form and the computation of iPWB
depends on PWi and random number bi. Therefore, if the adversary wants to guess iPW , they have to first know iPWB , which is 
used to compute 5M  in Step 2 of mutual authentication and  session key negotiation phase, where 
 5 1 4|| || ||xK i iM E M M PWB C  and iPWB  is encrypted with key xK . Thus, the adversary cannot retrieve iPWB  without xK . 
Accordingly, the adversary cannot compute iPWB  using 6M  without yK , where  
' '
6 || || || ||i i x j jM h ID PWB K r T . Hence, 
this proposed protocol claims that it is immune to the password guessing attack.  
 
2) Privileged insider attack 
 
During the registration, as mentioned in the literature [5], [6], a user’s password should not be sent to RS in plaintext form during 
the registration phase in order to resist the insider attack. In the registration phase of this work, Ui sends a masked password 
iPWB  to RS instead of PWi, where  ||i i iPWB h PW b . Therefore, the insider attach of RS cannot extract iPW  from iPWB  
due to the strong collision resistance property of the hash function h(). 
 
3) User impersonation attack 
 
Suppose that an adversary endeavors to impersonate Ui. In order to do it, the adversary first captures Ui’s message from the 
public channel and then makes an effort to generate another valid message, which should be authenticated by RS. The adversary 
traps ii TMID ,, 5  from the public channel and tries to compute iy CKM ,,2  using the known information. However, the 
adversary cannot compute 2M  and yK  without i  and x , respectively, where x  is the secret key of RS. In addition, iC  is also 
secure being stored in the registration software in Ui in encrypted form. Therefore, it is difficult task for the adversary to 
impersonate Ui.  
 
4) Server impersonation attack 
 
An adversary may try to impersonate RS in the mutual authentication phase. In this proposes protocol, RS sends 7M  to the 
registration software in Ui through an open channel, where  '7 6 ||
y
jK
M E M r . Note that 7M  is encrypted with key yK  and 
it is depends on 6M  and jr , where  
'
6 || || || ||i i x j jM h ID PWB K r T . It is clear that the adversary can easily generate a random 
number, but to compute 6M , the adversary needs ),( xi KPWB . However, the adversary is unable to successfully compute 
 ,i xPWB K  from the public message. Therefore, this proposed protocol can withstand the server impersonation attack.  
 
5) Stolen-verifier attack 
 
This type of attack occurs when the stored information in RS is leaked, however, the authentication system should not be 
affected by the adversary. Suppose that the information stored in the table available to RS has been compromised, where the 
table contains the entries of the form    , , ,i i i i iID UNSID SL SK h ID x  . Note that the adversary cannot extract  ih ID x  
without iSK . Furthermore, a valid user is not able to obtain long-term information from RS. Therefore, the adversary is unable to 
get any advantage after obtaining the stored table.  
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6) Denial-of-service attack 
 
In biometric based authentication, the biometric information may be affected due to noise during the biometric acquisition, 
resulting in difficulty in reproducing the exact biometric data signature accurately each time. The hash function is very sensitive 
to even slight changes in the input. Therefore, the hash function cannot be applied directly to the biometric data. A legal user 
may even fail to login to the remote server due to noisy biometric sensor data. If a biometric based authentication protocol relies 
on verifying  * ?i ih BT hBT , in each session, then Ui may get rejected and in biometric authentication this phenomenon is 
called the DoS attack. In order to resist such kind of problem, a fuzzy extractor is typically used. Therefore, the registration 
software in Ui passes the biometric verification of Ui and thus, it can withstand the DoS attack.  
 
7) Mutual authentication 
 
Mutual authentication [23] is typically one of the important and enviable property of any client-server authentication protocol. In 
Step 3 of the mutual authentication phase of this work, RS verifies the authenticity of Ui by checking the condition 3
'
3 ?MM   
whereas Ui checks 6
'
6 ?MM   in Step 5 to verify the legitimacy of RS. Therefore, this proposed protocol achieves the mutual 
authentication property. 
  
8) Man-in-the-middle attack 
 
In this form of attack, the adversary ensnares the public messages and attempts to act as a middle broker between the user and the 
remote server. In user impersonation attack, the work demonstrated that the adversary cannot generate a forged login message 
without knowing the user’s secret information. For the same reason, the adversary cannot also impersonate the RS. Therefore, 
this proposed protocol can withstand the man-in-the-middle attack. 
 
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
This section appraises the performance of the proposed protocol in terms of computation and communication costs with other 
competitive protocols [7], [9], [10]. This work uses crypto-operations to evaluate the computation cost. The notations and 
description of the crypto-operations are: 
 
 Te:  Time needed to perform exponentiation operation. 
 Tpm: Time needed to perform elliptic curve point   multiplication operation.  
 Th:  Time needed to perform one-way hash operation. 
 Ts:  Time needed to perform symmetric key  encryption/decryption operation. 
 
TABLE II provides computation costs of this proposed protocol compared to the relevant literature [7], [9], [10]. This proposed 
protocol requires an increased computation cost, however for the considered device, the increase in computation cost is marginal 
compared to the significantly improved security benefits. 
 
The communication cost of this work compared to the literature [7], [9], [10] was analyzed. It was observed that this proposed 
protocol has a lower communication cost than the protocols considered in the literature. For comparison purposes, this work 
assumed that the length of IDi, PWi and BTi are 64 bits of length each. In addition, the message digest of the hash function, ECC-
point multiplication and symmetric key encryption produced 160-bits, 160-bits and 128-bits, respectively. TABLE III presents 
the communication overhead cost and it can be observed that the proposed protocol is very efficient in terms of the 
communication cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12 
TABLE II 
COMPARISON OF THE COMPUTATIONAL COST OF THIS WORK 
COMPARED TO THE LITERATURE 
 User cost Server cost Total cost 
     Yang et al. [7] 
she TTT 134 
 
she TTT 126 
 
she TTT 2510 
 
     Lee et al. [9] shpm TTT 152 
 
shpm TTT 142 
 
shpm TTT 294 
 
     He et al. [10] shpm TTT 152 
 
shpm TTT 142 
 
shpm TTT 142 
 
Proposed shpm TTT 353 
 
shpm TTT 253 
 
shpm TTT 5106 
 
 
TABLE III 
COMPARISON OF THE COMMUNICATION COST OF THIS WORK 
COMPARED TO THE LITERATURE 
 User Server Total cost 
     Yang et al. [7] 4224  1312  5536  
     Lee et al. [9] 480  480  960  
     He et al. [10] 480  480  960  
Proposed 256  256  512  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The main intention of this paper is to provide security protection on the stored information in the consumer device from the 
unauthorized access by implementing an authentication protocol. In order to do it, this paper proposes a mutual authentication 
and key negotiation protocol using elliptic curve cryptography. The security verification of the protocol has been done using 
BAN logic and the security analysis ensures that the protocol can withstand several relevant security attacks. The protocol is not 
only efficient in terms of security attacks, but it also achieves high performance in terms of communication cost in comparison 
with the existing protocols. Moreover, the proposed protocol provides the mutual authentication property between the 
participants involved and provides a password update facility to registered users. This work enables secure biometric personal 
storage devices to be configured from an Internet service and maintained throughout the lifetime of the device.  
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